Navy Leaders Exclusive: How Are Conventional Navies Dealing With The Irregular Threat Of Drones?

In the absence of a conventional navy, Ukraine has put on a remarkable performance in the Black Sea. Several Russian ships have been damaged or sunk by cheap naval drones in a military campaign that has forced Russia to move most of its fleet to Russia or occupied Georgia. Trying to replicate the success of the Ukrainians, the Houthis have launched aerial and naval drones to target civilian and allied military vessels that have disrupted the global shipping industry. The strategic effects of both campaigns beg the question, have irregulars wrested the initiative from conventional navies on the open seas?

The Asymmetric Threat Of Drones

Irregular actors, through the utilisation of drones, have disrupted the power balance on the high seas. Seaborne drones in the Black and Red seas are capable of carrying larger payloads ranging from 100-800 kilograms which many times matches more conventional systems like the Tomahawk which has a payload around 450 kg [TWZ]. To put the kind of damage these boats can cause in perspective, when the USS Cole was hit by a small boat carrying around 225 kg of explosives, 17 U.S. sailors were killed and the Cole was left with a large hole in the port bow [BBC],[24th MEU].

Drones represent a completely new challenge for conventional navies. In the words of subject matter expert Rui Costa, “Conventional naval vessels, particularly legacy systems, their sensors and effectors, are principally designed to also counter conventional naval weaponry [missiles, torpedoes].” While there has been a significant amount of training, especially in the United States Navy to counter the irregular threat of Iranian small boats similar to the one that struck the Cole, the improvements in survivability in the case of being hit by smaller aerial vehicles with a lighter payload has not improved as much. Mr. Costa added how Western forces can either avoid or mitigate the damage caused by swarms of aerial and seaborne drones, “Training your crews to respond to swarms of seaborne and airborne drones, designing your ship with damage scenarios unique to drone swarms in mind as well, designing the ship and its systems to also resist the lower payload impacts.” Yet, Mr. Costa concluded that preventing drones from getting to naval vessels is most important, something the West has done, albeit at a tremendous cost in the Red Sea. 

Countering Houthi Drones In The Red Sea

While the West has countered the Houthi drone threat with some success, it has done so at a tremendous cost. Successive Houthi attacks against allied vessels in the Red Sea consist of aerial drones that can carry 20 to 50 kilograms (kg) of explosives while seaborne drones carry loads between one hundred to two hundred kg [DIA],[TWZ]. The sometimes combined unmanned strikes against vessels in the Red Sea are fired in coordination with the more sophisticated and expensive anti-ship missiles provided by Iran. Combatting these threats are the sophisticated anti-air and ship missiles and sometimes machine gun fire of the West. Although the West has largely succeeded in intercepting aerial and seaborne threats, former Supreme Allied Commander at NATO and four-star Admiral James Stavridis contended in a comment to Navy Leaders that, “The ill-balanced spending equation in the Red Sea -- shooting down drones worth $100K with a $1M missile -- is unsustainable for the west. The key is to go ashore and shoot the archer before they can release the arrow, so to speak. That means aggressively destroying the radars, communications, weapons caches, transport systems, and repair/construction facilities.” Yet, for fear of escalation in the Red Sea, the U.S. seemingly has limited strikes against the logistical infrastructure that enables the Houthi’s arsenal of drones. Mr. Stavridis added that if you can’t go after the enemy’s logistics “...you need very strong point defence systems like the American close-in weapon system.” Yet there is a preference in the West to intercept targets at range which means using missiles such as the Standard Missile-6 and Standard Missile- 2 as well as the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile. While effective, the missiles range from one to four and a half million U.S. Dollars for each piece of ordinance fired [TWZ],[Politico]. Operations in the Red Sea have lasted for two years and have increasingly strained the U.S. Navy’s finances. Despite straining its finances, the West is faring far better in its battle against unmanned vehicles than Russia. 

Russia’s Effort To Counter USVs In Black Sea

Thousands of miles to the Northeast, the Russian Navy has proven almost entirely incapable of countering the Ukranian drone threat. Seaborne drones have either destroyed or damaged a third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet [Time]. While the Russians have found some success by countering seaborne drones with helicopters, according to Mr. Stavridis, the use of aviation has not been “...enough to embolden the Russians to come back to operationally effective waters. The Black Sea fleet is still being held well away from the combat zone and is having little impact on the overall fight.” In response to the change in Russian tactics, the Ukranians have been incredibly adaptive, outfitting some seaborne drones with anti-air missiles and operating more at night. 

A Timeline Of Efficient Counters For Unmanned Vehicles 

In the West, while more efficient counters exist, they have yet to be fixed on ships. The DragonFire directed energy weapon is a hopeful sign that the West might be able to counter irregular foes on an economically sustainable basis. According to the U.K. government, the laser costs just ten pounds to destroy a target [U.K. Government]. Yet, a relief to the strain on the West’s pocketbooks in the form of directed energy weapons is likely years away from mass production. A more simple solution for seaborne threats could theoretically be fielded sooner.

How Can USVs Be Defeated Today And Tomorrow?

The key to counter seaborne drones might be more seaborne drones. Despite developing its own seaborne drones, Russia has yet to scale production and destroy any Ukrainian USV (unmanned surface vehicle) with vehicles of its own. Instead of putting in an effort to contest Ukraine’s initiative in the Black Sea by developing and investing in efficient counters to the seaborne threat, Russia has retreated to ports in occupied Georgia and mainland Russia. Yet, the United States looks set to avoid the fortunes of the Russians in the Black Sea with its Replicator Program. With the Replicator Program, the Pentagon seeks to field a series of unmanned aerial and seaborne assets to swarm enemy targets. Yet some of these seaborne assets can likely be used to target an enemy’s drone if they decide to target the Navy’s more expensive surface vessels [Reuters]. Additionally, the Pentagon seeks to field these systems within the next two years, a faster than normal turnaround for the U.S. military and defence apparatus [U.S. DOD].

Drones As Allies In Naval Damage Control

Unmanned systems could also be utilised as an asset in naval damage control. Companies like Deep Trekker offer clients tethered remotely operated vehicles that can survey underwater damage. The company also provides a series of cheap land-based variants that have the potential of eventually replacing human operators in surveying fire damage onboard the ship [Deep Trekker]. Utilising drones in naval damage control could represent a further revolution in maritime affairs, affording Western commanders the opportunity to reduce casualties in the case of accidents or enemy actions. 

Conclusion

Established actors, like Russia and the West, have yet to decisively wrest the initiative from the irregulars on the open sea. Cheap drones have helped to degrade Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and have forced the West to wage an ongoing pyrrhic battle in the Red Sea. While irregular actors consistently field new technologies to counter established navies, navies with large surface vessels have struggled to counter their advancements in a timely manner. Yet, there is scope for the West to adopt the adversary’s tools to successfully counter or mitigate the threat of unmanned assets.